Tthe geopolitical stability of the Taiwan Strait is facing a „perfect storm“ in 2026, driven by a convergence of shifting U.S. priorities and domestic political cycles in both Beijing and Taipei. While many observers previously questioned the „Davidson Window“ – a prediction that China would attempt to control Taiwan by 2027 – Beijing’s calculus has been fundamentally altered by the perception of U.S. President Donald Trump’s non-interventionist stance. The recently released U.S. National Security Strategy, which prioritizes the Western Hemisphere and avoids designating China as a direct threat, has convinced Chinese leadership that Washington’s appetite for military intervention is at a historic low. This window of opportunity is further widened by the ongoing war in Ukraine, which continues to divert U.S. resources and attention away from the Pacific.
Beijing’s Calculation: Strategic Opportunity vs. Xi’s Legacy Internally, the pressure for „reunification“ is increasingly tied to Chinese leader Xi Jinping’s tenacious pursuit of a historical legacy as he approaches the end of his third term in 2027. Despite large-scale military purges that have raised questions about the People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) readiness for a complex amphibious assault, Beijing believes that if U.S. intervention is off the table, the PLA can easily outmatch Taiwan’s forces. Simultaneously, a decline in the popularity of Taiwanese President Lai Ching-te and recent trade tensions between Washington and Taipei – including 20% tariffs and a mandatory $250 billion investment in U.S. chip production—have fueled Beijing’s hope that the Taiwanese public may be distancing itself from pro-independence parties. While no imminent mobilization is yet visible, the combination of a distracted West and a conservative CCP leadership nearing a critical succession year suggests that any perceived provocation could trigger a decisive campaign sooner than once imagined.
Read the full analysis on the Foreign Affairs website.