This meticulously researched study draws on newly opened communist archives to explore the evolving relationship between the Soviet Union and East Germany from Stalin’s death in 1953 through the construction of the Berlin Wall in 1961. Harrison demonstrates that, contrary to the common view of the GDR as a passive client, East German leaders—especially Walter Ulbricht—were often able to resist, influence, and even shape Soviet policy to serve their own interests. The book details how Ulbricht leveraged Soviet fears of losing control over East Germany, particularly as mass emigration threatened the regime’s stability, to push for stronger measures, culminating in the closure of the Berlin border and the erection of the Wall.

Harrison examines key turning points, such as Ulbricht’s resistance to the Soviet “New Course” in 1953, the aftermath of the June 17 uprising, and the shifting dynamics under Khrushchev’s leadership. The study highlights the constraints on Soviet policy, the limits of Moscow’s control over local implementation, and the ways in which East German leaders could exploit the superpower’s strategic anxieties. The book also situates the Soviet–East German relationship within the broader context of Cold War competition, showing how the GDR’s actions and urgings influenced the trajectory of the Berlin Crisis and the ultimate decision to build the Wall