This book mobilizes the concept of strategic culture to analyze the complex mix of continuity and change in German security policy between 1990 and 2003. It begins by exploring the historical roots of West Germany’s postwar strategic culture—marked by legal and political barriers to military engagement, a commitment to multilateralism, and a strong aversion to the use of force due to the lessons of the past. The study then examines how the end of the Cold War and national unification propelled Germany into a radically new security environment, requiring it to shift from being a net beneficiary to a net producer of security in Europe.

Through detailed case studies—including Germany’s abstention in the First Gulf War, its initial peacekeeping roles in Bosnia, and its full combat participation in Kosovo—the book reveals how legal, political, and societal debates shaped the Bundeswehr’s transformation for out-of-area missions. It also covers Germany’s response to the events of 9/11, its involvement in Afghanistan, and its opposition to the 2003 Iraq War, highlighting the persistent influence of strategic culture on policy decisions.

Additional chapters address internal debates over defense reform and the endurance of conscription, showing how domestic factors and historical memory continued to shape Germany’s approach to military engagement. The book concludes by arguing that while Germany’s security policy has adapted to new realities, it remains deeply influenced by its past, and its strategic culture continues to both enable and constrain the use of force.